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Reviewers' comments: 
Reviewer #1 (Remarks to the Author): 
Please find my report on the attached pdf.
[Editorial Note: This pdf is included on pages 2-8 of this report].
Report on “For uncertain climate change, immediate action is the best strategy” 
I find this article very interesting but I do have some doubts. Let me start by making sure I 
understood the paper by writing a summary of my understanding of it. The authors should 
correct me if I missed something. 
This work comprises the study of cooperative behavior for the individual management of 
public goods, here, applied to the problem of climate change mitigation.  
The authors devise a repeated game based on the collective risk dilemma, a game that mimics 
the potential for disaster that collectively affects all players involved whenever contributions 
fall behind a given threshold. They introduce a generic risk function, 𝑝𝑟, which depends on 
the total contributions at any given round and sets the probability of disaster at that round. 
Disaster, in turn, is defined by a fixed fraction, 𝛼, of the player’s current wealth being lost, 
creating an effective (ensemble average) dampening of wealth of 1 − 𝛼𝑝𝑟. In each round, 
players can decide to contribute to the game a given amount. 
In this work, the authors chose to study the outcomes of 2-players games over a finite set of 
𝑅 rounds. The set of possible strategies consists of 𝑅 thresholds, 𝜏𝑟, and two contribution 
levels, 𝑎 and 𝑏: in each round, if the total contributions so far, 𝐶𝑟, is above the threshold of a 
player, 𝐶𝑟 > 𝜏𝑟, he contributes 𝑎, else, 𝐶𝑟 < 𝜏𝑟, he contributes 𝑏. The success of a (player 
with a given) strategy, i.e. the success of the set ({𝜏𝑟}; 𝑎, 𝑏), is obtained by computing the
average payoff of that strategy when playing against several different strategies in a 
population and setting a probability of propagation of the strategy in the population that is a 
growing function of that payoff. The most successful strategies, in this sense, spread in the 
population.  
The authors study this model through simulations. They start by looking at the effect the 
different risk functions, 𝑝𝑟 ≡ 𝑝(𝐶𝑟), and loss factor – 𝛼, which effectively rescales 𝑝𝑟 – have
on the average contributions and they explore this in games with different durations, 𝑅 =
1,2, and 4. They show that 𝛼 increases cooperation but, for longer games, in this case 𝑅 = 4, 
intermediate values of 𝛼 can maximize the average contribution; though not for all shapes of 
𝑝. In any scenario, a non-zero risk of disaster induces cooperation – which corroborates 
previous results.  
On a second stage, the authors extend the functional form of 𝑝𝑟 taking an explicit dependence 
on the round. It is not very clear to me, but I assume there is still a dependence in the total 
contributions but in this case the author redefined 𝑝𝑟 such that 𝑝𝑟 = 𝑝(𝐶𝑟)𝑑𝑟, where 𝑑𝑟 is
some binary function that determines if disaster may actually happen in that round or not. So, 
in the first results, scenario i), disaster could happen every round, 𝑑𝑟 = 1, and at this stage it 
can happen in three other scenarios: ii) only on first round, 𝑑𝑟 = 𝛿0𝑟, iii) only on last round,
𝑑𝑟 = 𝛿𝑅𝑟, and iv) a random round, 𝑋~Unifom(1, 𝑅), setting 𝑑𝑟 = 𝛿𝑟𝑋. The authors find 
similarities between scenario i) and ii) and between iii) and iv). Most importantly, they find 
a common strategy of increased contributions in the initial rounds to be the most successful. 
I find the “multiple loss model” a very valuable improvement in the approach to the study of 
risky games with long duration, being important to scientists in the field of Evolutionary 
Game Theory, and also experimental economics and climate and other public goods 
management. As I see it, the rounds conceptually map into real world time, whereas the 
evolution (or Evolutionary Game Theory) is used as a tool to find prevalence of strategies 
under frequency dependent scenarios. The most notable result relates to the last figure (Figure 
3) in which the authors show that two different successful strategies are possible: the “wait
and see” and the “act quickly” strategies. Nonetheless, the authors could improve the
manuscript by making it clearer if they were able to show that one is more prevalent than the
other or why is that so.
Let me start with a minor point, which relates exactly to figure 3, that then builds into a more
general concern. Given that the whole analysis of the figure is based on the contributions per
round, wouldn’t the results be much clearer if the axis were Rounds-Contributions (x-y)? We
could then see in which round contributions are larger and the authors could even signal
where the disaster happens. In my mind, this makes since given that, aside from the name,
there is not really a relationship between the different lambdas and I failed to get an intuitive
interpretation for it, so it becomes just a parameter to check the generality of the results; and
that could be represented by different lines or a shade with some standard deviation for the
ensemble of parameters. Additionally, one should then ask what happens for the remaining
parameters. As far as I understand, there is also 𝑊0, 𝜎, and 𝜇. Ideally, 𝜎 and 𝜇 should just
help getting to equilibrium faster but 𝑊0 does bring the different effective (average payoffs)
functions closer to each other: take for instance the step function for small 𝜆, that is basically
a straight line at ½, and the linear risk curve for small lambda, that is a straight line near 1.
Setting larger 𝑊0 for the step function may bring the two together and the results that seemed
to not happen for the threshold function then show up but only for larger 𝑊0.
My second point is related exactly with the strategies “wait and see” and “act quickly”. In
fact, the players are using strategies ({𝜏𝑟}; 𝑎, 𝑏), and those are the ones under selection. Can
we understand the average levels of cooperation in the light of the most frequent strategy?
What is a “wait and see” strategy and a “act quickly” strategy in terms of the ({𝜏𝑟}; 𝑎, 𝑏)? Is
this clear from the results of the simulations or just from the average outcome? It seems
peculiar that by the end of the article, we don’t know what strategies the individuals are
actually adopting. Are they too diverse to reach any conclusion? Is 𝑎 > 𝑏, generally, or vice-
versa? What is the average threshold per round? Also, are the results driven by noise, in the
sense that it requires heterogeneous populations to get the two strategies the authors find?
A more abstract comment has to do with a measure of success in the different scenarios.
Since the authors are talking about climate change, and the ultimate goal is to understand
how well the different strategies are doing in terms of preserving the public good, I believe
a measure of this would give the article a bigger statement in terms of the effects of different
macro-strategies (let me call them that way, to distinguish from the strategies the individuals
actually play). Indeed, we know that higher total contributions do not mean better outcomes:
if the contributions come too late, they might not solve any problem and, additionally, the
lack of initial contributions may have caused too many disasters on the way. I could think of
average number of disasters as a good measure to explore.
As a third point, I have to say that I am concerned with the one equation of the paper. See:
The authors say that, in a given round, if a loss happens, the current endowment is lost.
However, when we look at equation [1] a loss in the first round does not affect the
Endowment that is transported to the second round, it is as if the two disasters affect, at the
same time, the last round. Is this just some mistake in the formula and the authors did not use
the formula for the simulations or is this error propagated?
Besides correcting the formula, it would be interesting to see some partially analytical 
treatment of this framework/game. See my notes below, which contain quite a bit of hand-
waving and back of the envelope calculations. Feel free to use them, as I think the paper 
would become much clearer from the game theoretical point of view: it would allow one to 
understand what is going on in terms of the interplay between the shape of the risk function 
and the effective costs and benefits of this iterative game. 
My last three points are more suggestions than really things that need to be deeply 
incorporated in the manuscript. i) Why is the whole analysis limited to 4 rounds? Is it due to 
computational limitations? In the limit, one could think of a continuous time that describes 
the real decision process under an evolutionary-time that provides evolutionary stable 
distributions of strategies. ii) Is the scenario of a disaster happening in the first round different 
from a game with a single round? If so, why? iii) It would be nice to see scenarios in which 
one maps the perception of closeness (in time) of disaster by setting a threshold value above 
which disaster actually happens. I.e., studying the scenarios in which the disaster occurs 
every round, only after one round, after two rounds, after three rounds, …, after 𝑀 rounds. 
In the previous notation would be something like setting 𝑑𝑟 = Θ(𝑟 − 𝑀). That would give a 
clear portrait of the effect of discounting the proximity of disaster from a (evolutionary) game 
theoretical point of view.  
Overall, as far as I am aware, the paper brings novelty to the area, thus being of interest to 
the experts on the field. Furthermore, it will provide a new setup to explore the outcome of 
this dilemma we so deeply need to understand. Once the authors address extended 
exploration of parameters, analytical intuition on the output, and clarification of the 
interpretation of the model, if the results still hold (which I believe to be the case), the claims 
will be stronger and sound. The manuscript is well written but is lacking simplification of 
arguments and missing conclusions that follow more directly from the results shown (or 
maybe missing the results that lead to those conclusions). This would create a shorter version 
of the present paper, opening space for the additional materials necessary. This said, and 
being clear that I have a positive opinion of the paper, I believe the authors should be allowed 
to revise their manuscript to address the specific concerns before a final decision is reached. 
Below the authors can find some notes written as I read through the paper as well as the notes 
on the average payoff structure. 
Best regards 
Vítor V. Vasconcelos  
In here, I go through the paper and leave the authors some other questions and comments that 
might help improve the manuscript. Even if some things seem irrelevant, I believe 
clarification of these small questions would make the manuscript more sound both 
scientifically and literarily.    
Abstract: 
Line 12: devise a game where the risk of a collective loss is unpredictable or can reoccur. 
 Or? Or do you mean and? 
“wait and see” and “act quickly” strategy is not defined in the abstract nor it is said that will 
be defined in the article. Maybe drop strategy, if the authors mean exactly what the usual 
words mean. 
Line 12: when risk declines rapidly and its timing is known.  
I am not sure what “timing of risk” means. Could you clarify? 
Line 15: we find that catastrophic scenarios are not necessary to induce such immediate 
collective action. In most scenarios… 
Even after reading the paper I don’t really know which ones are the catastrophic scenarios 
and which ones aren’t. Maybe I missed it, but it was only in the abstract and in the 
conclusions that I found this distinction between mild and catastrophic scenarios. It would 
help the manuscript clarifying which ones are which in the discussion.  
Also notice that the careful reader of the abstract sees the scenarios unpredictable loss vs 
reoccurring loss and different declining risks and known vs unknown timing and all of 
them seem catastrophic. 
Introduction: 
The paragraph before line 42 
Explicitly stating that the different real world examples mentioned are expectedly 
asynchronous and thus represent reoccurrences of disasters with the same fundamental 
origin would clarify the importance of the manuscript, besides creating a bridge with the 
following paragraph.  
Line 48: individuals do not know when the risk will hit. 
Is it the risk that hits? Or the disaster. 
Results: 
Line 71: We apply evolutionary game theory to understand and identify the set of stable 
contributions under various risk scenarios. 
Do the authors agree that stable here is being used in a very loose sense? In this case EGT 
does not provide stable contributions but a dynamically stable distribution of strategies that 
comprise different thresholds and contributions. The average contributions per round may 
be an emergent pattern, though… They could also be stable to changes in parameters or 
simply convergent in time.  
Line 73: Stability means that that a player would have no incentive to change her 
contribution  
This follows in line with my previous comment about EGT, what the outcome is and what 
the meaning of stable two sentences before is. The authors seem to be describing concepts 
closer to Nash and other equilibria that assume full knowledge of the game. As the authors 
later clarify, this is not the case with EGT. 
Line 86: Intermediate values of \alpha lead to differentiated contributions because of the 
complex interactions between the fraction of wealth lost and the risk curve. 
What do you mean by differentiated contributions? Are they differentiated by amounts, 
rounds, players, …? 
Line 89: The reason is that intermediate potential losses imply an inherent uncertainty as 
the number of rounds increase —intermediate losses may accumulate over the course of the 
game, adding up to a large overall loss. 
The reasoning for optimal alpha seems obscure and probably follows from the intuition the 
authors derive from the study they did but does not follow through the results the readers 
see. Perhaps the analytical treatment would clarify this. 
In figure 1 
Some scenarios are much more risky than others as they systematically present higher 
probabilities of failure. Is there a way to compare scenarios that are similar? Is this how the 
authors classify mild and catastrophic scenarios?  
Line 108: To summarize, we find that for the game with multiple losses, high initial risks 
and full losses are not necessary to observe cooperative 
Isn’t this written two sentences before? 
Figure 3:  
Again, either changing the x-axis to round or explicitly write round 1, round 2, … in the 
different colors would make the figure more readable. For a while I thought r=1 meant only 
one round, and so on. Clearly, nothing is missing and with some effort one can interpret the 
figure. But all the arguments are of contributions over time and that is not what comes 
immediately from the image. 
Line 118: the game with multiple losses elicits a similar amount of contributions as the 
game where the potential loss only occurs in the first round  
Not for the threshold game with those parameters. The authors could clarify what they 
mean by similar. There are similarities and differences between all the scenarios. It would 
be important to clarify what those similarities are. 
If the authors are comparing total contribution, it would be good to have a cumulative 
contribution line to really compare the scenarios in what total contribution is concerned. 
Line: 123: It seems that if risk is in a fixed round and exhibits strong threshold effects, 
individuals can time their contributions accordingly. However moving beyond this 
particular case, we find that an “act quickly” strategy is most robust.  
It seems that according to what? 
Conclusions: 
Line 131: how rapidly losses increase with the intensity of the events  
Aren’t losses and intensity of an event the same thing over all the models that we see in the 
literature? As I see it, one assumes losses as a fundamental quantity in the decision making, 
i.e., the intensity of an event is the losses it causes to a single individual. Could the authors
clarify?
Line 156: We have shown that under uncertainty in terms of the timing of losses, 
individuals increase their efforts to ensure contributions are sufficient not only for now, but 
that their future is also protected. Importantly, our results provide another compelling 
argument for immediate climate action. 
I find this argument a little confusing. The model is not descriptive of the actions of 
individuals, right? The model finds from an EGT point of view the strategies that are most 
fit to deal with the game that is posed to the players. Otherwise, one could ask “why most 
nations do not contribute to climate mitigation?”.  The last sentence, on the other hand, 
does make sense in the light of the interpretation that the model is capturing the best 
unilateral responses if we agree the game is the one being played by the actors. I feel the 
manuscript would have a lot to gain if this argument is clear from the beginning and one 
leaves no doubt of what the model is trying to capture: is it describing the behavior of 
players over time when they face this dilemma or is it finding the patterns of contributions 
that are able to persist when players are adopting the most successful behaviors in a 
rationally bounded environment? 
Methods: 
Line 162: We use evolutionary game theory to identify robust contributions between 
interacting players 
Robust over time, you mean? Or are we talking about “evolutionary robust strategies”? 
Line 163: This means players do not know the structure of the game and cannot apply 
advanced reasoning about their possible actions. 
Exactly, which seems to contradict the definition of stability in line 73. 
170: [Is a>b or vice versa? What is the strategy that emerges?] 
Line 169: that depends on the collective contributions accumulated over all rounds so far, 
Cr 
The threshold depends on the contributions? Or on the round? I thought 𝜏𝑟 was a set of 
numbers that defined the strategy of a player. Is this correct? 
Line 179: Errors occur with a probability _ for the thresholds _ and the contributions of 
each round independently. If they occur, errors in the threshold values add Gaussian noise 
with standard deviation _ to them. Errors in the contributions are made using a uniform 
distribution. 
It would improve reproducibility if the authors clarify if errors occur in the reproduction 
process or during the game. Also, the uniform distribution is between what and what? 0 and 
W0? Can players end the rounds with negative endowment? 
Other: There is a lost full stop in line 167. 
Notes on average Payoff 
The payoff can be computed as the expected endowment in the last round. If you let {𝑑𝑟} =
{𝑑1, … , 𝑑𝑅} be a binary vector in which 1’s represent the occurrence of a disaster, then 
𝑃({𝑑𝑟}) = ∏(1 − 𝑝𝑟)
1−𝑑𝑟𝑝𝑟
𝑑𝑟  
𝑅
𝑟=1
. 
With this, one can compute 
Π𝑖 = ∑ 𝑃({𝑑𝑟}) (∏(1 − 𝛼)
𝑑𝑟𝑊0
𝑅
𝑟=1
− ∑ 𝑐𝑟𝑖 ∏(1 − 𝛼)
𝑑𝑘
𝑅
𝑘=𝑟
𝑅
𝑟=1
)
{𝑑𝑟}
 
Which can be written as 
Π𝑖 = 𝑊0 ∏(1 − 𝛼 𝑝𝑟)
𝑅
𝑟=1
− ∑ 𝑐𝑟𝑖 ∏(1 − 𝛼 𝑝𝑘)
𝑅
𝑘=𝑟
𝑅
𝑟=1
1 
Which, for computational purposes, can be given by 
given 𝑋 = 𝑊𝑖0, do 𝑋 ← (1 − 𝑝𝑟𝛼)(𝑋 − 𝑐𝑖𝑟) with 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑅.
This is fairly easy to interpret as it means that in each round, on average, the endowment is 
reduce by a factor of 𝑝𝑟𝛼, which is what I meant when I described the effect of 𝛼 in the 
first paragraphs.  
The particular case of 2 rounds becomes 
Π𝑖 = (1 − 𝑝1𝛼)((1 − 𝑝1𝛼)(𝑊0 − 𝑐𝑖1) − 𝑐𝑖2).
First, this proofs that 𝛼 and 𝑝𝑟 contribute equally to the process and justifies fixing a 
maximum of 1 for 𝑝𝑟, since 𝛼 is able to rescale that maximum from 0 to 1. Additionally, 
one can look at the marginal gains of switching to some other contribution (by whichever 
mechanism: changing 𝑎, changing 𝑏, changing 𝜏) in any given round, which, ultimately, is 
what drives the replication process. If a given player changes 𝑐𝑖𝐾 to 𝑐𝑖𝐾 + 𝛿, in round 𝐾, 
then one could look at a small 𝛿 and show that increasing a contribution will increase the 
first term of Eq.(1) (effective initial endowment 𝑊0) by an amount that depends on the 
derivative of 𝑝(𝐶𝑟) but will also increase the second term (effective cost) by an amount that
is higher the later on round the contribution happens, thus explaining the “quick action” 
result. 
Reviewer #2 (Remarks to the Author):  
Our understanding of the underlying mechanisms responsible for promoting and maintaining 
cooperation within the context of a collective-risk social dilemma (applicable to the prevention of 
climate change scenarios) is limited to some extent, despite many excellent papers appearing in the 
related literature in recent years.  
This paper continues this line of work by presenting an analysis of an extension to the collective-
risk social dilemma, using evolutionary game theory. As such, the paper represents a small 
incremental study, extending earlier work from some of the authors (eg., [18] [19]), rather than a 
describing novel research direction.  
The authors explicitly examine the perception of risk, and associated implications when making a 
decision (contribution), by focussing on specific risk curves and timing of ` disturbances' (of 
varying severity?) in the game. They develop a game where individuals are faced with the risk of 
a loss in a specific round of the game, which can be a ` one-off' single round occurrence or could 
occur in random round of the game. Exploring the effects of a potential losses in this setting is 
interesting, especially when individuals can retain some of the resource after an `event.' This 
approach is reasonable given the constraints of the adopted abstract modelling framework.  
The paper is generally well written. However, some aspects of the approach/methodology 
require clarification. For example, further details describing the definition of (distinction between) 
`games per generation and the number of rounds in a game would be of benefit to the reader, 
allowing other researchers to implement the model unambiguously. Also, further clarification for 
the selection of risk curves should be included (was it based solely on previous work?).  
Detailed simulation results and analysis have been included in the paper. The metrics used for 
evaluation were defined clearly. The results reported in Fig 2-3 are 'steady-state' values (?). 
Representative temporal dynamics could also be included, illustrating the effectiveness of the 
learning process (particularly in terms of risk curves and the `severity of any loss.' Additional 
discussion of the effects of parameter values (as depicted in Fig 3) is warranted. Also, there is 
room to explain/justify the appropriate similarity between any risk curve for large \lambda. More 
generally, why does a ` power-function lead to results that appear to be significantly different to 
`step-like' functions across \lambda values? (see Fig 3a Fig 3b)  
On the whole, the results and analysis are appropriate, supporting the claims made in the text. The 
conclusion is appropriate, and has been discussed in the wider context of coupled human-social-
ecological systems.  
Additional minor comments: 
* Does stability within the model (see lines 73-75) always emerge (under all circumstances)?
* What impact does the shape of the risk curve actually have? Can a clear relationship in terms of
\lambda be stated?
* What is the analytical prediction for the game outcome over multiple rounds? How does this
depend on the risk curve/parameter values?
 
* System dynamics are guided by the embedded ` social learning' /evolutionary updated 
mechanism. Further analysis/description would be interesting.  
 
* How does the unpredictable nature of a ` catastrophic disturbance' impact system dynamics over 
(a) longer time periods/rounds; (b) larger population sizes; and (c) the value of \alpha for these 
different parameter values?  
 
* There is room to clarify the captions in Fig 1 and 2  
 
* Fig 3 suggests that there is significant difference in the performance metric (av contribution) for 
specific risk curves, \lambda values, with magnifications of differences in the early round. The 
summary of results is consistent with the plots, however, what happens over longer time periods / 
rounds, especially for larger \lambda values? For small \lambda values, I am not convinced that a 
general conclusion can be made (based on the evidence presented). Further theoretical analysis 
and supporting numerical simulations would help to clarify these points.  
 
* From line 117 ... "Interestingly, the game with multiple losses elicits a similar amount of 
contributions as the game where the potential loss only occurs in the first round" ... Further 
discussion/clarification would enhance the paper.  
 
* From line 149-150 .... "This is a striking difference between our current and previous research 
on climate cooperation".... Perhaps you could highlight the fact that the model described in this 
paper represents a small incremental step.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reviewer #3 (Remarks to the Author):  
 
Nature Communications Review: “For uncertain climate change, immediate action is the best 
strategy”  
 
The authors use evolutionary game theory to model a collective-risk game wherein individuals may 
suffer losses of varying degrees over one to four rounds of play. The authors examine the effects 
of the timing, probability, and extent of damages on average contributions using simulations of a 
model developed specifically to look at the question of whether delayed losses affect the 
contribution profiles of individuals in the game.  
 
The paper touches on a few important aspects of climate change that have not been sufficiently 
covered in the (experimental) literature on international climate cooperation (e.g., Milinski et al., 
2008; Milinski et al., 2011; Tavoni et al., 2011; Dannenberg et al., 2014). For instance, the 
uncertainty of the timing of losses and the possibility of recurring losses are both important 
features of the climate problem that require further scrutiny to enhance the generalizability of the 
existing literature (which is more or less confined to theoretical and experimental investigation due 
to the difficulty of implementing field studies on the subject). Additionally, the cumulative effects 
of contributions toward reducing future risk represent a realistic component of the climate problem 
often neglected in the literature.  
 
While the authors appear to situate the paper within the experimental literature on international 
climate cooperation (see reference to Milinski et al., 2011; line 43), the study presented here uses 
evolutionary game theory to draw conclusions regarding individuals’ responses to various features 
of climate damages. However, these models may produce questionable predictions, as evidenced 
through comparison with observed outcomes. For example, Smead et al.’s (2014) finding that 
heterogeneity of endowments (wealth) actually increases cooperation goes against both intuition 
and all theoretical and experimental results of which I am aware (e.g., Barrett, 2004; Tavoni et 
al., 2011), and other conclusions drawn in the Smead paper (e.g., regarding restricting private 
demands) were not replicable in a lab experiment designed to closely model their ABM (Gosnell 
and Tavoni, 2017). Therefore, perhaps aside from its specific application here, I am rather 
skeptical of the method’s ability to predict actual behavior amidst convoluted incentive structures 
outlined in the behavioral economics and political economy literatures.  
 
Moreover, the usefulness of the main findings themselves may be limited. The authors claim that 
the “act quickly strategy is most robust due to uncertainty”, which simply endorses adoption of the 
precautionary principle in a situation where the necessity of early action is widely accepted. The 
existing question is not one of whether acting quickly is the correct strategy in the presence of 
multiple dimensions of uncertainty; instead, it is how to successfully promote and achieve such 
near-term cooperation (i.e. it is a political economy / human behavior problem). What happens 
when we play this game with actual people, and with (many) heterogeneous players?  
 
It seems to me this paper could be substantially enhanced if the authors complement the model 
with a behavioral experiment that allows for direct comparison of the results from their simulations 
to observed outcomes from complex and non-deterministic human interactions; the outcomes of 
both methods may then be compared and contrasted with established economic theories and 
various relevant real-world contexts (especially international climate negotiations) to comment on 
generalizability. The experimental addition would not only allow the research to avoid critique 
regarding the general oversight of AB models’ explanatory performance (e.g., see Windrum et al., 
2007), it would also provide methodological insight and a means for direct comparison of the 
outcomes of the model with the experimental literature cited in the paper’s introduction. 
Furthermore, for the sake of replicability and transparency, it would be a good idea for the authors 
to make their source code available with the publication, and perhaps also provide 
(supplementary) information with regards to the model’s sensitivity to the chosen parameters.  
 
 
Minor edits:  
• “Reoccur” and “reoccurance” should be replaced with “recur” and “recurrence” throughout the 
manuscript  
• First sentence of abstract: Climate change will not be mitigated; perhaps change to “dangerous 
climate change”? (And “requires” global cooperation.)  
o First sentence of paper: is it true that “everyone” needs to exert effort to reduce climate change 
effects? Consider rephrasing this sentence.  
• Change the comma after “debatable” to a semicolon.  
• Line 23: decide “whether” to contribute (remove “or not”).  
• Lines 24-25: “But in light of dangerous climate change…” Why? Due to the framing of 
losses/damages rather than benefits accrued from the public good? Justify this claim.  
• Lines 39-40: commas after “Also” and after “will be”  
• Lines 42-44: this sentence needs some restructuring or grammatical editing.  
• Lines 51-97: These are not results nor discussion, this is your model; perhaps create a section 
for this part that precedes the results section.  
• Line 114 (and subsequent text): How is the overall probability of losses held constant when 
losses occur either one time or multiple times? This was not clear to me from the text in the 
manuscript, and further explanation may be merited.  
• Line 167: remove the full stop after ‘strategy’ (and add one to line 184 after ‘dynamics’).  
 2 
Reviewers' comments: 
 
Reviewer #1 (Remarks to the Author): 
 
Report on “For uncertain climate change, immediate action is the best strategy”  
I find this article very interesting but I do have some doubts. Let me start by 
making sure I understood the paper by writing a summary of my understanding of 
it. The authors should correct me if I missed something. This work comprises the 
study of cooperative behavior for the individual management of public goods, 
here, applied to the problem of climate change mitigation.  
The authors devise a repeated game based on the collective risk dilemma, a 
game that mimics the potential for disaster that collectively affects all players 
involved whenever contributions fall behind a given threshold. They introduce a 
generic risk function, 𝑝𝑟, which depends on the total contributions at any given 
round and sets the probability of disaster at that round. Disaster, in turn, is 
defined by a fixed fraction, 𝛼, of the player’s current wealth being lost, creating an 
effective (ensemble average) dampening of wealth of 1−𝛼𝑝𝑟. In each round, 
players can decide to contribute to the game a given amount.  
In this work, the authors chose to study the outcomes of 2-players games over a 
finite set of 𝑅 rounds. The set of possible strategies consists of 𝑅 thresholds, 𝜏𝑟, 
and two contribution levels, 𝑎 and 𝑏: in each round, if the total contributions so 
far, 𝐶𝑟, is above the threshold of a player, 𝐶𝑟>𝜏𝑟, he contributes 𝑎, else, 𝐶𝑟<𝜏𝑟, 
he contributes 𝑏. The success of a (player with a given) strategy, i.e. the success 
of the set ({𝜏𝑟};𝑎,𝑏), is obtained by computing the average payoff of that strategy 
when playing against several different strategies in a population and setting a 
probability of propagation of the strategy in the population that is a growing 
function of that payoff. The most successful strategies, in this sense, spread in 
the population.  
The authors study this model through simulations. They start by looking at the 
effect the different risk functions, 𝑝𝑟 𝑝(𝐶𝑟), and loss factor – 𝛼, which effectively 
rescales 𝑝𝑟 – have on the average contributions and they explore this in games 
with different durations, 𝑅=1,2, and 4. They show that 𝛼 increases cooperation 
but, for longer games, in this case 𝑅=4, intermediate values of 𝛼 can maximize 
the average contribution; though not for all shapes of 𝑝. In any scenario, a non-
zero risk of disaster induces cooperation – which corroborates previous results.  
On a second stage, the authors extend the functional form of 𝑝𝑟 taking an explicit 
dependence on the round. It is not very clear to me, but I assume there is still a 
dependence in the total contributions but in this case the author redefined 𝑝𝑟 
such that 𝑝𝑟=𝑝(𝐶𝑟)𝑑𝑟, where 𝑑𝑟 is some binary function that determines if 
disaster may actually happen in that round or not. So, in the first results, scenario 
i), disaster could happen every round, 𝑑𝑟=1, and at this stage it can happen in 
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three other scenarios: ii) only on first round, 𝑑𝑟=𝛿0𝑟, iii) only on last round, 𝑑𝑟=𝛿𝑅𝑟, and iv) a random round, 𝑋~Unifom(1,𝑅), setting 𝑑𝑟=𝛿𝑟𝑋. The authors 
find similarities between scenario i) and ii) and between iii) and iv). Most 
importantly, they find a common strategy of increased contributions in the initial 
rounds to be the most successful.  
I find the “multiple loss model” a very valuable improvement in the approach to 
the study of risky games with long duration, being important to scientists in the 
field of Evolutionary Game Theory, and also experimental economics and climate 
and other public goods management. As I see it, the rounds conceptually map 
into real world time, whereas the evolution (or Evolutionary Game Theory) is 
used as a tool to find prevalence of strategies under frequency dependent 
scenarios. The most notable result relates to the last figure (Figure 3) in which 
the authors show that two different successful strategies are possible: the “wait 
and see” and the “act quickly” strategies.  
 
Thank you for the description of our model and for the positive and encouraging 
comments. Technically, our game is not repeated – there are R rounds, but the 
resulting payoff contributes to fitness only once. The effects that are usually 
considered in repeated games are not present in our model. 
 
Nonetheless, the authors could improve the manuscript by making it clearer if 
they were able to show that one is more prevalent than the other or why is that 
so.  
Let me start with a minor point, which relates exactly to figure 3, that then builds 
into a more general concern. Given that the whole analysis of the figure is based 
on the contributions per round, wouldn’t the results be much clearer if the axis 
were Rounds-Contributions (x-y)? We could then see in which round 
contributions are larger and the authors could even signal where the disaster 
happens. In my mind, this makes since given that, aside from the name, there is 
not really a relationship between the different lambdas and I failed to get an 
intuitive interpretation for it, so it becomes just a parameter to check the 
generality of the results; and that could be represented by different lines or a 
shade with some standard deviation for the ensemble of parameters. 
Additionally, one should then ask what happens for the remaining parameters. As 
far as I understand, there is also 𝑊0, 𝜎, and 𝜇. Ideally, 𝜎 and 𝜇 should just help 
getting to equilibrium faster but 𝑊0 does bring the different effective (average 
payoffs) functions closer to each other: take for instance the step function for 
small 𝜆, that is basically a straight line at ½, and the linear risk curve for small 
lambda, that is a straight line near 1. Setting larger 𝑊0 for the step function may 
bring the two together and the results that seemed to not happen for the 
threshold function then show up but only for larger 𝑊0.  
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We agree, now we have added a new figure 3 where we show round vs 
contribution. For the remaining parameters we have added the previous figure to 
the supplementary, Fig S2.  We agree that we have focused too much on the 
different curves in the previous version and also renamed the lambda parameters 
to distinguish them.  
 
My second point is related exactly with the strategies “wait and see” and “act 
quickly”. In fact, the players are using strategies ({𝜏𝑟};𝑎,𝑏), and those are the 
ones under selection. Can we understand the average levels of cooperation in 
the light of the most frequent strategy? What is a “wait and see” strategy and a 
“act quickly” strategy in terms of the ({𝜏𝑟};𝑎,𝑏)? Is this clear from the results of the 
simulations or just from the average outcome? It seems peculiar that by the end 
of the article, we don’t know what strategies the individuals are actually adopting. 
Are they too diverse to reach any conclusion? Is 𝑎>𝑏, generally, or vice-versa? 
What is the average threshold per round? Also, are the results driven by noise, in 
the sense that it requires heterogeneous populations to get the two strategies the 
authors find?  
 
In the continuous case of strategy space it is almost impossible to narrow down 
to the exact strategy (corresponding to a “genotype”), because there are many 
ways in which a player can contribute the same or a similar amount 
(corresponding to a “phenotype”). Our simulation average only shows the actions 
of players -- we did not attempt to search within the strategy space, as it seems 
of minor interest how exactly these behaviors are encoded. However, we have 
explored this exact question in a discontinuous action space in a previous study. 
We now have clarified this issue by describing the outcomes as behaviors and 
not strategies.  
 
A more abstract comment has to do with a measure of success in the different 
scenarios. Since the authors are talking about climate change, and the ultimate 
goal is to understand how well the different strategies are doing in terms of 
preserving the public good, I believe a measure of this would give the article a 
bigger statement in terms of the effects of different macro-strategies (let me call 
them that way, to distinguish from the strategies the individuals actually play). 
Indeed, we know that higher total contributions do not mean better outcomes: if 
the contributions come too late, they might not solve any problem and, 
additionally, the lack of initial contributions may have caused too many disasters 
on the way. I could think of average number of disasters as a good measure to 
explore.  
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Thank you, we agree that our measure of success may not be intuitive. We have 
now included in Fig 3 how the player’s contributions reduce the risk, which is an 
alternative measure of the average number of disasters. The reduction of risk 
translates into protecting the good in climate change. But importantly, in our case 
strategies that maximize personal success spread and success of the group in 
reducing the number of disasters is just a by-product 
 
As a third point, I have to say that I am concerned with the one equation of the 
paper. See:  
The authors say that, in a given round, if a loss happens, the current endowment 
is lost. However, when we look at equation [1] a loss in the first round does not 
affect the Endowment that is transported to the second round, it is as if the two 
disasters affect, at the same time, the last round. Is this just some mistake in the 
formula and the authors did not use the formula for the simulations or is this error 
propagated?  
 
Thank you very much for capturing this crucial point. This is an embarrassing 
oversight on our part in terms of describing the payoffs arising from an earlier 
version of the manuscript. You are right, the remaining endowment of course has 
to reflect previous losses. We have now corrected the equation, but we decided 
to not overload our notation by the additional condition that contributions must be 
below the current endowment (which is important for large α).   Fortunately, this 
does not have any impact on our other results and simulations since they are not 
based on this equation (and the equation is only there for illustrative purposes).  
 
Besides correcting the formula, it would be interesting to see some partially 
analytical treatment of this framework/game. See my notes below, which contain 
quite a bit of hand-waving and back of the envelope calculations. Feel free to use 
them, as I think the paper would become much clearer from the game theoretical 
point of view: it would allow one to understand what is going on in terms of the 
interplay between the shape of the risk function and the effective costs and 
benefits of this iterative game.  
 
Thank you. We have a general frame work for a single round game that was 
previously developed for the original game (Hagel et al., Scientific Reports 2016). 
However, this game grows in complexity quickly such that an analytical 
calculation would only work in specific circumstances and not as a general 
approach. Please refer to the new supplementary section called “analytical 
results”. 
 
My last three points are more suggestions than really things that need to be 
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deeply incorporated in the manuscript. i) Why is the whole analysis limited to 4 
rounds? Is it due to computational limitations? In the limit, one could think of a 
continuous time that describes the real decision process under an evolutionary-
time that provides evolutionary stable distributions of strategies.  
 
Our model is not limited by computational considerations, we wanted to maintain 
a balance with simplicity and complexity of the model. We have previously 
explored a related game with up to 20 rounds. But since now we include a 
continuous strategy space, it seems to be redundant to explore a large number of 
rounds with such a large parameter space – in particular if the trends are similar. 
Moreover, the setup is already so complex that it does not seem to be easy to 
grasp it.  
 
ii) Is the scenario of a disaster happening in the first round different from a game 
with a single round? If so, why?  
 
No, as you anticipate they are identical. This is shown in our new Figure 3. 
 
iii) It would be nice to see scenarios in which one maps the perception of 
closeness (in time) of disaster by setting a threshold value above which disaster 
actually happens. I.e., studying the scenarios in which the disaster occurs every 
round, only after one round, after two rounds, after three rounds, …, after 𝑀 
rounds. In the previous notation would be something like setting 𝑑𝑟=Θ(𝑟−𝑀). That 
would give a clear portrait of the effect of discounting the proximity of disaster 
from a (evolutionary) game theoretical point of view.  
 
Overall, as far as I am aware, the paper brings novelty to the area, thus being of 
interest to the experts on the field. Furthermore, it will provide a new setup to 
explore the outcome of this dilemma we so deeply need to understand. Once the 
authors address extended exploration of parameters, analytical intuition on the 
output, and clarification of the interpretation of the model, if the results still hold 
(which I believe to be the case), the claims will be stronger and sound.  
 
Thank you for the kind and positive comments, we hope our revised version is 
clearer. We have now extended the model in several ways and added more of 
the extensive parameter exploration that we have performed before.  
 
The manuscript is well written but is lacking simplification of arguments and 
missing conclusions that follow more directly from the results shown (or maybe 
missing the results that lead to those conclusions). This would create a shorter 
version of the present paper, opening space for the additional materials 
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necessary. This said, and being clear that I have a positive opinion of the paper, I 
believe the authors should be allowed to revise their manuscript to address the 
specific concerns before a final decision is reached.  
 
Thank you for the kind and positive comments. We have now re-organized the 
paper, moved the exploration of risk curve parameters to the supplement and 
added additional material that should in our opinion make it easier to understand 
the gist of the model.  
 
 
Below the authors can find some notes written as I read through the paper as 
well as the notes on the average payoff structure.  
 
In here, I go through the paper and leave the authors some other questions and 
comments that might help improve the manuscript. Even if some things seem 
irrelevant, I believe clarification of these small questions would make the 
manuscript more sound both scientifically and literarily.  
Abstract:  
Line 12: devise a game where the risk of a collective loss is unpredictable or can 
reoccur.  
Or? Or do you mean and? “wait and see” and “act quickly” strategy is not defined 
in the abstract nor it is said that will be defined in the article. Maybe drop 
strategy, if the authors mean exactly what the usual words mean.  
 
Thank you. Changed.  
 
Line 12: when risk declines rapidly and its timing is known.  
I am not sure what “timing of risk” means. Could you clarify?  
 
Thank you, we have clarified these statements now. We referred  to situations 
where the loss can occur in a random round.  
 
Line 15: we find that catastrophic scenarios are not necessary to induce such 
immediate collective action. In most scenarios…  
Even after reading the paper I don’t really know which ones are the catastrophic 
scenarios and which ones aren’t. Maybe I missed it, but it was only in the 
abstract and in the conclusions that I found this distinction between mild and 
catastrophic scenarios. It would help the manuscript clarifying which ones are 
which in the discussion.  
Also notice that the careful reader of the abstract sees the scenarios 
unpredictable loss vs reoccurring loss and different declining risks and known vs 
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unknown timing and all of them seem catastrophic.  
 
Thank you, we have clarified these statements. Indeed, there is not a clear 
distinction anymore, as the fraction of wealth lost can range from 0 to 1. We 
referred to the case of α=1 here.  
 
Introduction:  
The paragraph before line 42  
Explicitly stating that the different real world examples mentioned are expectedly 
asynchronous and thus represent reoccurrences of disasters with the same 
fundamental origin would clarify the importance of the manuscript, besides 
creating a bridge with the following paragraph.  
 
Thank you, we have added a sentence to clarify this issue.  
 
Line 48: individuals do not know when the risk will hit.  
Is it the risk that hits? Or the disaster.  
 
Thank you, we have corrected the sentence.  
 
Results:  
Line 71: We apply evolutionary game theory to understand and identify the set of 
stable contributions under various risk scenarios.  
Do the authors agree that stable here is being used in a very loose sense? In this 
case EGT does not provide stable contributions but a dynamically stable 
distribution of strategies that comprise different thresholds and contributions. The 
average contributions per round may be an emergent pattern, though… They 
could also be stable to changes in parameters or simply convergent in time.  
 
We agree that we use the term “stable” in a loose sense. For the evolutionary 
algorithm we use, the connection to stability in a classical game theoretical sense 
is not yet formally established. We also agree that the underlying coding of 
behaviors leaves room for variation, as only the contributions determine fitness.  
However, since evolutionary models typically impose higher requirements on 
stability than classical game theory, we believe that our analysis is meaningful.  
 
Line 73: Stability means that that a player would have no incentive to change her 
contribution This follows in line with my previous comment about EGT, what the 
outcome is and what the meaning of stable two sentences before is. The authors 
seem to be describing concepts closer to Nash and other equilibria that assume 
full knowledge of the game. As the authors later clarify, this is not the case with 
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EGT.  
 
We agree, but since any ESS is also a Nash equilibrium, there is an intimate 
connection between the two. However, we agree that our explanation for stability 
did not resonate with our evolutionary approach and thus we have changed that 
sentence.  
Line 86: “Intermediate values of \alpha lead to differentiated contributions 
because of the complex interactions between the fraction of wealth lost and the 
risk curve.“ 
What do you mean by differentiated contributions? Are they differentiated by 
amounts, rounds, players, …?  
 
Thank you. We meant amounts of contributions, we have corrected the sentence.  
 
Line 89: “The reason is that intermediate potential losses imply an inherent 
uncertainty as the number of rounds increase —intermediate losses may 
accumulate over the course of the game, adding up to a large overall loss.”  
The reasoning for optimal alpha seems obscure and probably follows from the 
intuition the authors derive from the study they did but does not follow through the 
results the readers see. Perhaps the analytical treatment would clarify this. 
 
In general, contributions increase with increasing alpha. However, for particular 
risk curves the contributions are decreasing with large alpha. This can happen 
under uncertainty at intermediate risks or alphas. However, we feel that this 
effect is quite special and should not be the focus of our work, it has been 
discussed in Hilbe et al, PLOS One, 2013.    
 
In figure 1  
Some scenarios are much more risky than others as they systematically present 
higher probabilities of failure. Is there a way to compare scenarios that are 
similar? Is this how the authors classify mild and catastrophic scenarios?  
  
Thank you. Yes, we have not assumed that risk curves are comparable in the 
sense that the risk across all contributions is the same – this would also 
immediately imply several other issues that would come up. However, we realize 
that there are two issues that we have not delineated enough in the previous 
manuscript: One is the probability that a loss occurs (given by the risk curve) and 
the second one is the magnitude of the loss controlled by alpha (small alpha is a 
mild loss and very large alpha a catastrophic loss). With multiple rounds, it is no 
longer possible to look at a single, combined parameter for this. 
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Line 108: To summarize, we find that for the game with multiple losses, high 
initial risks and full losses are not necessary to observe cooperative  
Isn’t this written two sentences before?  
 
Thank you we have omitted the previous sentence. 
 
Figure 3:  
Again, either changing the x-axis to round or explicitly write round 1, round 2, … 
in the different colors would make the figure more readable. For a while I thought 
r=1 meant only one round, and so on. Clearly, nothing is missing and with some 
effort one can interpret the figure. But all the arguments are of contributions over 
time and that is not what comes immediately from the image.  
 
We agree that the previous figure 3 was too ambitious and a figure showing 
contributions vs. rounds is crucial for our presentation. We have now replaced 
Fig. 3 by such a figure which is hopefully easier to interpret. The previous figure 
is now part of the supplementary, Fig S2. 
 
 
Line 118: the game with multiple losses elicits a similar amount of contributions 
as the game where the potential loss only occurs in the first round  
Not for the threshold game with those parameters. The authors could clarify what 
they mean by similar. There are similarities and differences between all the 
scenarios. It would be important to clarify what those similarities are.  
If the authors are comparing total contribution, it would be good to have a 
cumulative contribution line to really compare the scenarios in what total 
contribution is concerned.  
 
We agree that this has to be clarified, we now added further explanation. 
 
Line: 123: It seems that if risk is in a fixed round and exhibits strong threshold 
effects, individuals can time their contributions accordingly. However moving 
beyond this particular case, we find that an “act quickly” strategy is most robust.  
It seems that according to what?  
 
Thank you we have fixed the sentence. 
 
Conclusions: Line 131: how rapidly losses increase with the intensity of the 
events Aren’t losses and intensity of an event the same thing over all the models 
that we see in the literature? As I see it, one assumes losses as a fundamental 
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quantity in the decision making, i.e., the intensity of an event is the losses it 
causes to a single individual. Could the authors clarify?  
 
The idea that alpha puts on the table is that not all risky of disastrous events 
would affect individuals the same way. Here we aim to disentangle the probability 
and intensity of losses.  
 
Line 156: We have shown that under uncertainty in terms of the timing of losses, 
individuals increase their efforts to ensure contributions are sufficient not only for 
now, but that their future is also protected. Importantly, our results provide 
another compelling argument for immediate climate action.  
I find this argument a little confusing. The model is not descriptive of the actions 
of individuals, right? The model finds from an EGT point of view the strategies 
that are most fit to deal with the game that is posed to the players. Otherwise, 
one could ask “why most nations do not contribute to climate mitigation?”. The 
last sentence, on the other hand, does make sense in the light of the 
interpretation that the model is capturing the best unilateral responses if we 
agree the game is the one being played by the actors. I feel the manuscript would 
have a lot to gain if this argument is clear from the beginning and one leaves no 
doubt of what the model is trying to capture: is it describing the behavior of 
players over time when they face this dilemma or is it finding the patterns of 
contributions that are able to persist when players are adopting the most 
successful behaviors in a rationally bounded environment?  
 
We agree that the phrasing of the end of our conclusion was unlucky. We now 
focus on what the model tells us: Which strategies would be evolutionary 
advantageous in such a scenario. The last sentences have been reworded 
accordingly. 
 
Methods:  
Line 162: We use evolutionary game theory to identify robust contributions 
between interacting players Robust over time, you mean? Or are we talking 
about “evolutionary robust strategies”?  
 
Clarified. We refer to evolutionary robustness here. 
 
Line 163: This means players do not know the structure of the game and cannot 
apply advanced reasoning about their possible actions. Exactly, which seems to 
contradict the definition of stability in line 73. 
 
Not necessarily, as evolutionary stability implies stability in terms of Nash 
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equilibria here. However, we reworded our notion of stability in the previous line 
83, as we start from evolutionary stability.  
 
170: [Is a>b or vice versa? What is the strategy that emerges?]  
Line 169: that depends on the collective contributions accumulated over all 
rounds so far, Cr  
The threshold depends on the contributions? Or on the round? I thought 𝜏𝑟 was a 
set of numbers that defined the strategy of a player. Is this correct?  
 
We have now added an example of a simple 2 round game with two players and 
their strategies to make sure that our explanation is understandable. We do not 
ask for a>b or a<b, we just say that there is a different threshold tau of the total 
contributions so far in each round r and that players invest a certain amount 
below it and another one above it. Restricting the model to a<b would mean that 
players would invest more if more has already been contributed, which seems a 
strong restriction to us.  
 
Line 179: Errors occur with a probability _ for the thresholds _ and the 
contributions of each round independently. If they occur, errors in the threshold 
values add Gaussian noise with standard deviation _ to them. Errors in the 
contributions are made using a uniform distribution.  
It would improve reproducibility if the authors clarify if errors occur in the 
reproduction process or during the game. Also, the uniform distribution is 
between what and what? 0 and W0? Can players end the rounds with negative 
endowment? Other: There is a lost full stop in line 167.  
 
Players cannot spend more than what they have, we do not allow negative 
payoffs. We have clarified this and the other comments in the text. 
 
Notes on average Payoff  
[…] 
 
We highly appreciate the efforts of the reviewer to put our analysis on a more 
solid, analytical basis. A crucial part of the model is that the probabilities p 
depend on the past actions, which implies an intricate entanglement of the 
dynamics between several players in the case of heterogeneous strategies. The 
approach the reviewer outlines seems to be suitable for an analysis in the spirit of 
adaptive dynamics and could serve to analyze our model in much more depth in 
the future. For now, we have applied our general frame work (Hagel et al., 
Scientific Reports 2016) to this boarder setup that includes heterogeneity in 
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wealth.   Please refer to the analytical results section in the supplementary 
material. 
   
Reviewer #2 (Remarks to the Author): 
 
Our understanding of the underlying mechanisms responsible for promoting and 
maintaining cooperation within the context of a collective-risk social dilemma 
(applicable to the prevention of climate change scenarios) is limited to some 
extent, despite many excellent papers appearing in the related literature in recent 
years. This paper continues this line of work by presenting an analysis of an 
extension to the collective-risk social dilemma, using evolutionary game theory. 
As such, the paper represents a small incremental study, extending earlier work 
from some of the authors (eg., [18] [19]), rather than a describing novel research 
direction.  
 
Thank you, we agree that “our understanding of the underlying mechanisms 
responsible for promoting and maintaining cooperation within the context of a 
collective-risk social dilemma (applicable to the prevention of climate change 
scenarios) is limited” and we hope that our expansion of this game broadens our 
perspective and understanding. In this study we extend the typical game, which 
only considers a single complete loss event, to other scenarios where player can 
potentially retain some wealth despite multiple losses. Now, in this resubmission, 
we also include the effects of inequality (rich and poor) and how multiple rounds 
and loss events affect their contribution - this is a closer application to the 
prevention of climate change, but of course remains within the restrictions of our 
model. We have an additional supplementary file describing the results of the 
simulations. 
 
The authors explicitly examine the perception of risk, and associated implications 
when making a decision (contribution), by focussing on specific risk curves and 
timing of `disturbances' (of varying severity?) in the game. They develop a game 
where individuals are faced with the risk of a loss in a specific round of the game, 
which can be a `one-off' single round occurrence or could occur in random round 
of the game. Exploring the effects of a potential losses in this setting is 
interesting, especially when individuals can retain some of the resource after an 
`event.' This approach is reasonable given the constraints of the adopted 
abstract modelling framework.  
 
Thank you. 
 
The paper is generally well written. However, some aspects of the 
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approach/methodology require clarification. For example, further details 
describing the definition of (distinction between) `games per generation and the 
number of rounds in a game would be of benefit to the reader, allowing other 
researchers to implement the model unambiguously. Also, further clarification for 
the selection of risk curves should be included (was it based solely on previous 
work?).  
 
Thank you, we have clarified this now in response to the three reviews. 
 
 
Detailed simulation results and analysis have been included in the paper. The 
metrics used for evaluation were defined clearly. The results reported in Fig 2-3 
are 'steady-state' values (?). Representative temporal dynamics could also be 
included, illustrating the effectiveness of the learning process (particularly in 
terms of risk curves and the `severity of any loss.'  
 
Yes, we have shown the steady state before. To reduce the resulting confusion, 
we have now replaced the previous figure 3 by the new figure 2, showing the 
(average) temporal dynamics.  
 
Additional discussion of the effects of parameter values (as depicted in Fig 3) is 
warranted. Also, there is room to explain/justify the appropriate similarity between 
any risk curve for large \lambda. More generally, why does a `power-function 
lead to results that appear to be significantly different to `step-like' functions 
across \lambda values? (see Fig 3a Fig 3b) 
 
The step function originally used by Milinski et al 2008 was discontinuous, 
individuals experience a zero risk or a 90% risk, for instance. Discontinuous 
functions are captured in our case only in the extreme limit as lambda increases 
to infinity for the Fermi curve. Since this discontinuous case has been the main 
focus in the past, we aimed to explore how this special assumption may drive 
results.  
We have also changed our notation slightly, as it was misleading to use the same 
lambda to control the shape of very different curves. In the limit of large lambda, 
all these curves have very different properties. 
 
On the whole, the results and analysis are appropriate, supporting the claims 
made in the text. The conclusion is appropriate, and has been discussed in the 
wider context of coupled human-social-ecological systems. 
 
Thank you. 
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Additional minor comments: 
 
Does stability within the model (see lines 73-75) always emerge (under all 
circumstances)?  
 
Since our model is stochastic and includes mutations, this question is not trivial to 
answer. One would expect a stationary distribution, as our evolutionary process 
corresponds to a recurrent Markov chain. For low mutation rates (as we 
consider), one expects that the stationary distribution puts most weight on states 
that are stable in the case of no mutations.  
 
What impact does the shape of the risk curve actually have? Can a clear 
relationship in terms of \lambda be stated?  
 
No. We were interested in exploring very different curves and these do not lead 
to a single curve in a limit. Thus, the shape of the curve has to be explored 
separately and we apologize for the somewhat confusing notation in the previous 
submission. However, from a single round game we know that strongly declining 
risk can stabilize distribution and that the decrease in the risk curve has to be 
related to the number of players.   
 
What is the analytical prediction for the game outcome over multiple rounds? 
How does this depend on the risk curve/parameter values? 
 
We feel that such a detailed analysis of our model would only make sense if the 
basic model is accepted by the community and is thus beyond the current scope 
of the work. So far, there is a lot of focus on either the standard public goods 
game or the game with a strong threshold effect and a single risk in the last 
round. Moreover, the standard analytical predictions do not take into account 
stochastic effects and it is known that these can have a major impact on the 
results.  
 
System dynamics are guided by the embedded `social learning' /evolutionary 
updated mechanism. Further analysis/description would be interesting. 
 
The evolutionary update mechanism has been used a variety of contexts and in 
basic settings, most evolutionary processes lead to very similar results. The 
update we use has the additional benefit that one can consider non-weak 
selection, where the results become closer to the deterministic processes that 
have been considered since the early days of evolutionary game theory.  
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How does the unpredictable nature of a `catastrophic disturbance' impact system 
dynamics over (a) longer time periods/rounds; (b) larger population sizes; and (c) 
the value of \alpha for these different parameter values? 
 
We focus on steady states after many generations and large populations, which 
is typically the most robust case. We assume that the reviewer is interested in 
longer games (i.e. more rounds) with more players instead. We have explored 
these issues in previous publications with a related setup, but a much simpler risk 
scenario (e.g. Abou Chakra et al., PLOS CB, 2012). We thus decided to focus on 
the simpler case of two players and up to four rounds here, as our parameter 
space is very high dimensional.  
 
There is room to clarify the captions in Fig 1 and 2 
 
Thank you, agreed. We have rewritten the first caption and moved Fig. 2 to the 
appendix. 
 
* Fig 3 suggests that there is significant difference in the performance metric (av 
contribution) for specific risk curves, \lambda values, with magnifications of 
differences in the early round. The summary of results is consistent with the 
plots, however, what happens over longer time periods / rounds, especially for 
larger \lambda values? For small \lambda values, I am not convinced that a 
general conclusion can be made (based on the evidence presented). Further 
theoretical analysis and supporting numerical simulations would help to clarify 
these points. 
 
Thank you, we hoped to ensure consistency across. We presented the first 4 
round because we are confident that our results can be generalized to more 
rounds. However, in the interest of continuity and readability, we did not venture 
into these cases. We now have an additional supplementary figure S3 to show 
this, going up to 8 rounds. 
 
 
From line 117 ... "Interestingly, the game with multiple losses elicits a similar 
amount of contributions as the game where the potential loss only occurs in the 
first round" ... Further discussion/clarification would enhance the paper. 
 
We have reworded this statement and replaced the associated figure.  
 
From line 149-150 .... "This is a striking difference between our current and 
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previous research on climate cooperation".... Perhaps you could highlight the fact 
that the model described in this paper represents a small incremental step. 
 
Thank you, but we politely disagree here. In our opinion, the current focus on 
models with extreme thresholds and a single risk in the very end can be 
misleading and the consideration of continuous risk curves was a first step 
beyond that particular case. Recurrent losses could lead to very different 
conclusions about the mitigation of climate change, which should be taken into 
account carefully by researchers in this area.  
 
Reviewer #3 (Remarks to the Author): 
 
Nature Communications Review: “For uncertain climate change, immediate 
action is the best strategy” 
 
The authors use evolutionary game theory to model a collective-risk game 
wherein individuals may suffer losses of varying degrees over one to four rounds 
of play. The authors examine the effects of the timing, probability, and extent of 
damages on average contributions using simulations of a model developed 
specifically to look at the question of whether delayed losses affect the 
contribution profiles of individuals in the game. 
 
The paper touches on a few important aspects of climate change that have not 
been sufficiently covered in the (experimental) literature on international climate 
cooperation (e.g., Milinski et al., 2008; Milinski et al., 2011; Tavoni et al., 2011; 
Dannenberg et al., 2014). For instance, the uncertainty of the timing of losses 
and the possibility of recurring losses are both important features of the climate 
problem that require further scrutiny to enhance the generalizability of the 
existing literature (which is more or less confined to theoretical and experimental 
investigation due to the difficulty of implementing field studies on the subject). 
Additionally, the cumulative effects of contributions toward reducing future risk 
represent a realistic component of the climate problem often neglected in the 
literature. 
 
While the authors appear to situate the paper within the experimental literature 
on international climate cooperation (see reference to Milinski et al., 2011; line 
43), the study presented here uses evolutionary game theory to draw conclusions 
regarding individuals’ responses to various features of climate damages. 
However, these models may produce questionable predictions, as evidenced 
through comparison with observed outcomes. For example, Smead et al.’s 
(2014) finding that heterogeneity of endowments (wealth) actually increases 
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cooperation goes against both intuition and all theoretical and experimental 
results of which I am aware (e.g., Barrett, 2004; Tavoni et al., 2011), and other 
conclusions drawn in the Smead paper (e.g., regarding restricting private 
demands) were not replicable in a lab experiment designed to closely model their 
ABM (Gosnell and Tavoni, 2017). Therefore, perhaps aside from its specific 
application here, I am rather skeptical of the method’s ability 
to predict actual behavior amidst convoluted incentive structures outlined in the 
behavioral economics and political economy literatures. 
 
Thank you for these comments and the references. We actually think they 
strengthen our approach and do not see contradiction between our theoretical 
results and what Smead et al 2014 or Gosnell and Tavoni, 2017 show in their 
paper. To explain: our research, herein and our previous work (especially Hilbe, 
et al Plos One 2014 and Abou Chakra & Traulsen 2014 JTB) as well as Smead 
et al 2014 and Gosnell and Tavoni, 2017 all point to a similar trend - an 
increasing round number increases cooperation.  
1) the trend shown in Gosnell and Tavoni, 2017 Table 2 SYM and ASYM 
experiments (others cannot be compared -- we cannot model side 
negotiations/talk in our theory) show just that, and increase in cooperation as 
rounds increase.  
2) Smead et al 2014 also shows the same trend if one looks at Figure 1. This 
resembles closely 3) our round effects findings in Hilbe, et al Plos One 2014, cf. 
figure 3a.  
 
The current paper also shows this trend, increasing round number increases the 
amount individuals contribute and the timing. Fig 2-3 herein. We have improved 
our discussion of this issue now. 
 
Moreover, the usefulness of the main findings themselves may be limited. The 
authors claim that the “act quickly strategy is most robust due to uncertainty”, 
which simply endorses adoption of the precautionary principle in a situation 
where the necessity of early action is widely accepted. The existing question is 
not one of whether acting quickly is the correct strategy in the presence of 
multiple dimensions of uncertainty; instead, it is how to successfully promote and 
achieve such near-term cooperation (i.e. it is a political economy / human 
behavior problem). What happens when we play this game with actual people, 
and with (many) heterogeneous players?  
 
We cannot claim that we offer directly applicable insights about the political 
economy and human behavior problem. In our opinion, the most important insight 
of our work is that the different risk scenarios do have potentially important 
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consequences and should be explored further by theoretical and experimental 
work. We illustrate this by showing that evolutionary dynamics/social learning can 
lead to different outcomes.   
We agree that our homogeneous scenario where all players are identical is 
limited, thus we have run further simulations to prove that this will work under 
wealth heterogeneity. Please see the revised text and supplementary material, 
where we (i) explore the effects of heterogeneity and lost fraction alpha and (ii) 
the timing of contributions in rich and poor players. We can show that our 
conclusions of early contributions of “act quickly” still holds, even when players 
are heterogeneous is wealth and in the amount of the wealth they will potentially 
lose.  
 
It seems to me this paper could be substantially enhanced if the authors 
complement the model with a behavioral experiment that allows for direct 
comparison of the results from their simulations to observed outcomes from 
complex and non-deterministic human interactions; the outcomes of both 
methods may then be compared and contrasted with established economic 
theories and various relevant real-world contexts (especially international climate 
negotiations) to comment on generalizability. The experimental addition would 
not only allow the research to avoid critique regarding the general oversight of AB 
models’ explanatory performance (e.g., see Windrum et al., 2007), it would also 
provide methodological insight and a means for direct comparison of the 
outcomes of the model with the experimental literature cited in the paper’s 
introduction. Furthermore, for the sake of replicability and transparency, it would 
be a good idea for the authors to make their source code available with 
the publication, and perhaps also provide (supplementary) information with 
regards to the model’s sensitivity to the chosen parameters. 
 
Thank you we now have added a supplementary material that further clarifies our 
approach. We also share our program in a git hub repository 
(https://github.com/abouchakra/Collective-Risk-Dilemma). However, we are not in 
a position to change our theoretical work into an experimental study of behavior 
in such a game. None of us is an expert in experimental design and behavior and 
we feel that this would be beyond the scope of the current study to turn a 
theoretical paper into an experimental one. In fact, this would most probably 
provide sufficient material for a separate paper.  
 
 
Minor edits: 
• “Reoccur” and “reoccurance” should be replaced with “recur” and “recurrence” 
throughout the manuscript 
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Done. 
 
• First sentence of abstract: Climate change will not be mitigated; perhaps 
change to “dangerous climate change”? (And “requires” global cooperation.) 
 
The term “dangerous climate change” is sometimes seen as a technical term for 
threshold driven, irreversible climate change. However, we have reworded the 
sentence. 
 
o First sentence of paper: is it true that “everyone” needs to exert effort to reduce 
climate change effects? Consider rephrasing this sentence. 
 
Agreed and changed.  
 
• Change the comma after “debatable” to a semicolon. 
 
Done.  
 
• Line 23: decide “whether” to contribute (remove “or not”). 
 
Thank you, we adjusted the sentence. 
 
• Lines 24-25: “But in light of dangerous climate change…” Why? Due to the 
framing of losses/damages rather than benefits accrued from the public good? 
Justify this claim. 
 
Milinski et al 2008 devised a game framed around losses and damages to bring 
about the importance of the climate effect. Moreover, the temporal aspect of 
negotiations, thresholds and partial returns were important components of these 
studies. 
 
• Lines 39-40: commas after “Also” and after “will be” 
 
Thank you we adjusted the sentence accordingly 
 
• Lines 42-44: this sentence needs some restructuring or grammatical editing. 
 
Thank you we adjusted the sentence accordingly 
 
• Lines 51-97: These are not results nor discussion, this is your model; perhaps 
 21 
create a section for this part that precedes the results section. 
 
We have now changed this and hope it is consistent with the formatting 
requirements of the journal. 
 
• Line 114 (and subsequent text): How is the overall probability of losses held 
constant when losses occur either one time or multiple times? This was not clear 
to me from the text in the manuscript, and further explanation may be merited. 
 
We do not keep the overall expected losses constant here, this would require to 
e.g. reduce alpha when more losses can occur. However, as we are mostly 
interested in the timing of contributions, this also does not seem to be necessary. 
 
• Line 167: remove the full stop after ‘strategy’ (and add one to line 184 after 
‘dynamics’). 
 
Thank you we adjusted the sentence accordingly. 
 
We would like to thank all three referees for their detailed, insightful and 
constructive criticism on our previous manuscript. 
Reviewers' comments:  
 
Reviewer #1 (Remarks to the Author):  
 
I appreciate the attention the authors gave to addressing the questions raised. In particular, that 
they moved the focus away from the different curves and that they now make a clearer distinction 
between behavior and strategy. Also, the new figure 2 really helps reading the paper.  
The authors introduced a new layer of complexity on the model (which they managed by reducing 
the number of rounds). I do like this idea and it seems a good complement to the paper even 
though, as it is, it looks tangential. The Abstract does not mention any inequality testing; apart 
from reference 17, there is nothing in the Introduction either. The last three words of the 
Conclusions is the only reference to heterogeneity and it not clear if the authors mean 
heterogenous endowments. The Methods also don’t mention rich and poor (with W_"rich" and 
W_"poor" being undefined in the text, as far as I could tell). Clearly, I think the authors should 
mention they tested this too and articulate the text such that it is clear what and why they did and 
not just something that was added afterwards to have an analytical treatment in the paper.  
Regarding the description of the model, I was wondering if there is any figure or analysis with a 
group larger than 2. It is not clear as in line 80 the authors say “typically 2” but then in Figures 
1,2, S1,S2, and S3 the game is between 2, and in Figure 3, S4, and S5 I believe it is also 2 
players, one rich and one poor. If it is always two it would be better to make that statement 
without ambiguity. Additionally, I think it is very important to describe how the method changes in 
the heterogeneous case. What is the fraction of player of each type? I assume you restrict 
interactions between individuals of the same class. Is that so?  
The paper is lacking a brief discussion on how it relates to the real world and climate change 
mitigation in particular. Currently, we are not observing the successful strategies found by the 
model, which indeed reduce effective risk to zero. How does this help our comprehension of the 
problem? As I see it, the answer lies somewhere between discounting, perception of risk but, 
maybe what this work shows best, perception of individual impact on risk, as the authors imply 
when they say “as long as individuals can make a difference” l182. Additionally, I suggest 
complementing with a discussion on effects that were not considered that could potentially change 
this result for better or worse.  
Finally, equation [1] is not mentioned in the manuscript anywhere so it probably can be put inline 
with the text. Also, I don’t understand why is the second equality helpful. I still believe that the 
formulation I gave in last revision is more easily interpreted and generalized for any number of 
rounds: π_i=(1-p_2 α)((1-p_1 α)(W_0-c_(i,1) )-c_(i,2) ), i.e., players keep a fraction 1-pr alpha of 
whatever they expect to have in the previous round after contributing.  
 
I believe that after the authors harmonize the newly introduced analysis of heterogenous players 
with the remaining text and improve their conclusions with a critique of the model the paper can 
be considered for publication.  
 
Minor:  
Line 42: “predictions when” -> predicting when  
Line 43: “it will hit or how drastic it”, it is not clear what it references  
Line 44: “were” -> “where”  
Line 45: “asses” -> assess  
Line 60: M is not defined and it seems to be always 2.  
Line 69: “expected expected”->expected  
Line 100: “The effects of timing have only recently become apparent, experimental evidence and 
theoretical framework all point to the trend that…”->“The effects of timing have only recently 
become apparent, with experimental evidence and theoretical framework all pointing to the trend 
that…”  
Line 115: “a risk curves” -> “a risk curves”  
Line 167: The paragraph that starts has a weird articulation. In particular, the sentences “The 
collective-risk game…a high loss probability promotes contributions” seem a little lost. Their 
position makes the text alternate between the authors’ model, literature, and again model and 
results. Could easily be improved for readability.  
Line 200: “which are” -> “which is”. The strategy is singular in the previous clause.  
Line 213: “in the two player game, these groups are pairs of players”. Either I don’t understand 
what you mean or this is a very redundant sentence. “two player” should be hyphenated.  
SI l20: “0the”->the  
SI l27+28 and l34+35 are exactly the same and the part “their wealth they will lose” sounds 
weird.  
SI l50: remove “?”, as it is not a question but a statement of the question.  
SI 69: reference of the table is gone.  
SI the notation for the endowment is slightly inconsistent in the Manuscript and SI. Sometimes the 
authors use W0, sometimes W, or W_rich, W_R0, W_R, and equivalently for the poor.  
Figure S6: why would the rich have higher risk than that of the poor?  
Table 1: It would be interesting to have a plot of c_R*/c_P* as a function of wR/wP (for wR/wP>1) 
for a few lambdas, comparing to the 1:1 line, showing that, in a rich vs. poor interaction, it would 
be in the self-interest of the rich to overcarry their weight as inequality increases.  
 
 
Reviewer #2 (Remarks to the Author):  
 
The authors responses, edits to the paper (clarifications and/or re-drafting where necessary) have 
clarified my initial concerns.  
 
I have worked through the paper very carefully. I am confident that the paper presents an 
important contribution to the domain.  
 
I am now recommending that the paper be accepted for publication.  
 
 
Reviewer #3 (Remarks to the Author):  
 
Reviewer #3: R&R Comments for “Facing uncertain climate change, immediate action is the best 
strategy”  
 
The authors have improved the readability of the paper and situated it better within its literature, 
though in my view there could still be more insightful discussion surrounding the crucial caveats 
with respect to political economy and behavioral constraints, as well as better clarification 
regarding the selection of parameters to feed into their model. Additionally, varying overall 
expected losses removes the ability to make direct comparisons between the ‘potential losses in all 
rounds’ game and the ‘losses occur in one random round’ game (e.g., lines 129-130). With regards 
to overall writing mechanics, considerable editing and proofreading is required before this paper 
should be published, and the authors should be careful not to neglect commentary with regards to 
tables and figures (e.g., there is no commentary at all in section 2.1 of the Supplementary 
Material). As mentioned above, justification for selection of parameters (e.g. group size, number of 
rounds considered, proportional differences in wealth between R and P players, etc.) would help 
the reader to feel as though there is purpose behind these otherwise seemingly arbitrary numbers 
(though ideally these choices would have been pre-registered to assure us that these choices have 
not been subject to various researcher degrees of freedom).  
 
Minor comments:  
 
• ‘Uncertain’ appears twice in the title  
• Line 13: remove ‘that’  
• Line 15: what is ‘its’ referring to?  
• Line 20: replace ‘needs the’ with ‘requires’  
• Line 21: replace ‘on’ with ‘at’, remove comma after ‘challenge’  
• Line 23: ‘describing that the’ doesn’t make sense – revise wording  
• Line 40: ‘draughts’ should be ‘droughts’  
• Lines 44-45: ‘were’ should be ‘where’, ‘asses’ should be ‘assess’  
• Line 66: ‘the’ should be ‘then  
• Line 68: remove ‘always’; unless I’m missing something, 0 ≤ ci,r < Wi,r−1   is a constraint here, 
not an assumption  
• Model section: Need to be clear that W is equal across players in your initial model, i.e. players 
are homogeneous (otherwise socially optimal behavior stated in lines 75-76 may not hold)  
• Line 69: remove ‘expected’ (appears twice)  
• Line 72: Remove parentheses (you’ve already stated this constraint above)  
• Line 80: I am still uncertain why you only feed into the model groups of size 2; it would be good 
to get some justification here.  
• Line 115: should say ‘for risk curves with a threshold’  
• Line 130: ‘with’ should be ‘where’  
• Line 137: ‘occur’ should be ‘occurs  
• Line 140: this is a run-on sentence – surround the middle clause with dashes, perhaps.  
• Line 144: ‘disaster’ should be singular  
• Figure 3: Again, some explanation for the selection of parameters might be useful – seems 
somewhat arbitrary at the moment.  
• Lines 171-177: These sentences appear to come out of nowhere; I suggest deleting these, and 
moving the following sentence (beginning with ‘Our’) to before ‘Specifically’ on line 168. This 
paragraph does not flow at present.  
• Line 191: again, ‘on’ should be ‘at’.  
• Line 224: needs a reference.  
• “In addition to a potential loss event in every round or only  in the last round, we now consider 
scenarios with a potential loss only in the first round or in a single  random unknown round within 
the game.” What is this testing intuitively? For which climate scenarios is this relevant?  
• Line 152: “Random unpredictable risk events” – define? Or should this say ‘loss events’ instead 
of ‘risk events’, or ‘unpredictable-risk events’? (It seems also that ‘lost fraction’ alpha should 
instead be called a ‘loss fraction’)  
• Supplementary: Line 45 should say ‘negotiations’  
• Figure S4: “It is assumed that poor players lose everything, i.e. αP = 0.5.” I think this should 
say poor players lose half their wealth?  
• Supplementary Section 2.1 lacks any commentary? 
Reviewer #1 (Remarks to the Author): 
 
I appreciate the attention the authors gave to addressing the questions raised. 
In particular, that they moved the focus away from the different curves and 
that they now make a clearer distinction between behavior and strategy. Also, 
the new figure 2 really helps reading the paper.   
 
Thank you. 
 
The authors introduced a new layer of complexity on the model (which they 
managed by reducing the number of rounds). I do like this idea and it seems a 
good complement to the paper even though, as it is, it looks tangential. The 
Abstract does not mention any inequality testing; apart from reference 17, 
there is nothing in the Introduction either. The last three words of the 
Conclusions is the only reference to heterogeneity and it not clear if the 
authors mean heterogenous endowments. The Methods also don’t mention 
rich and poor (with W_"rich" and W_"poor" being undefined in the text, as far 
as I could tell). Clearly, I think the authors should mention they tested this too 
and articulate the text such that it is clear what and why they did and not just 
something that was added afterwards to have an analytical treatment in the 
paper.   
 
We agree that the addition of the rich and poor scenario was not linked well 
with the previous work. We have now  
(i) added a sentence in the abstract on this 
(ii) mentioned explicitly how one can address heterogeneity  
(iii) improved the link in the conclusions 
 
Regarding the description of the model, I was wondering if there is any figure 
or analysis with a group larger than 2. It is not clear as in line 80 the authors 
say “typically 2” but then in Figures 1,2, S1,S2, and S3 the game is between 
2, and in Figure 3, S4, and S5 I believe it is also 2 players, one rich and one 
poor. If it is always two it would be better to make that statement without 
ambiguity.  
 
We agree. We had indeed only used two players in the simulations we have 
shown, but we aimed to avoid giving the impression that this is a fundamental 
restriction of our work. We now show the new figure S2 in the SI which 
indicates that the model is not restricted in terms of the number of interacting 
players, but at the same time we reworded the statement.  
 
Additionally, I think it is very important to describe how the method changes in 
the heterogeneous case. What is the fraction of player of each type? I assume 
you restrict interactions between individuals of the same class. Is that so?  
 
No, we have so far focused on the interaction of one rich and one poor player, 
i.e. the different classes play with each other. In terms of strategy spreading, 
however, the strategies of the rich only spread to other rich players (and 
equivalently for the poor).  
 
The paper is lacking a brief discussion on how it relates to the real world and 
climate change mitigation in particular. Currently, we are not observing the 
successful strategies found by the model, which indeed reduce effective risk 
to zero. How does this help our comprehension of the problem? As I see it, 
the answer lies somewhere between discounting, perception of risk but, 
maybe what this work shows best, perception of individual impact on risk, as 
the authors imply when they say “as long as individuals can make a 
difference” l182. Additionally, I suggest complementing with a discussion on 
effects that were not considered that could potentially change this result for 
better or worse.  
 
We have now added additional discussion and literature regarding 
heterogeneity and the perception of risk. Please note that we are hesitant to 
make specific connections to behavior in the real world, since many factors 
influence a single decision. Our theoretical study only allows us to make a 
statement that the risk scenario will matter for optimal behavior, but it would 
be exaggerated to link it to specific behaviors.  
 
Finally, equation [1] is not mentioned in the manuscript anywhere so it 
probably can be put inline with the text. Also, I don’t understand why is the 
second equality helpful. I still believe that the formulation I gave in last 
revision is more easily interpreted and generalized for any number of rounds: 
π_i=(1-p_2 α)((1-p_1 α)(W_0-c_(i,1) )-c_(i,2) ), i.e., players keep a fraction 1-
pr alpha of whatever they expect to have in the previous round after 
contributing. 
 
We agree that this formulation could be more instructive if one aims at 
delineating the rounds and not the four possible scenarios. Thus, we now 
adopted the formulation proposed before already, but we prefer to have the 
equation more visible than an inline equation. Thank you.  
 
I believe that after the authors harmonize the newly introduced analysis of 
heterogenous players with the remaining text and improve their conclusions 
with a critique of the model the paper can be considered for publication.  
 
Minor:  
Line 42: “predictions when” -> predicting when 
Line 43: “it will hit or how drastic it”, it is not clear what it references 
Line 44: “were” -> “where” 
Line 45: “asses” -> assess  
Line 60: M is not defined and it seems to be always 2. 
Line 69: “expected expected”->expected 
Line 100: “The effects of timing have only recently become apparent, 
experimental evidence and theoretical framework all point to the trend that…”-
>“The effects of timing have only recently become apparent, with 
experimental evidence and theoretical framework all pointing to the trend 
that…” 
Line 115: “a risk curves” -> “a risk curves” 
Line 167: The paragraph that starts has a weird articulation. In particular, the 
sentences “The collective-risk game…a high loss probability promotes 
contributions” seem a little lost. Their position makes the text alternate 
between the authors’ model, literature, and again model and results. Could 
easily be improved for readability.  
Line 200: “which are” -> “which is”. The strategy is singular in the previous 
clause. 
Line 213: “in the two player game, these groups are pairs of players”. Either I 
don’t understand what you mean or this is a very redundant sentence. “two 
player” should be hyphenated.  
 
Thank you for the careful reading, we have implemented all the minor 
changes in the text. 
 
 
SI l20: “0the”->the 
SI l27+28 and l34+35 are exactly the same and the part “their wealth they will 
lose” sounds weird. 
SI l50: remove “?”, as it is not a question but a statement of the question. 
SI 69: reference of the table is gone.   
SI the notation for the endowment is slightly inconsistent in the Manuscript 
and SI. Sometimes the authors use W0, sometimes W, or W_rich, W_R0, 
W_R, and equivalently for the poor. 
 
Thank you, we have implemented all the minor changes in the supplementary 
text. 
 
 
Figure S6: why would the rich have higher risk than that of the poor? 
 
It has been argued that rich nations do not fear climate impact while other 
nations (typically poor) have had several drastic climatic events and thus 
consider risks in their decisions. We think it is interesting to explore this 
scenario, but for completeness we also included the case where the risk for 
the rich is higher, not lower. We have now included this in the discussion. 
 
 
Table 1: It would be interesting to have a plot of c_R*/c_P* as a function of 
wR/wP (for wR/wP>1) for a few lambdas, comparing to the 1:1 line, showing 
that, in a rich vs. poor interaction, it would be in the self-interest of the rich to 
overcarry their weight as inequality increases. 
 
We have tried this and many other ways to plot the contributions, but we 
realized that this is complex and very hard for non-experts to interpret. We 
thus decided to add figure S10 to the SI with a slightly different format, where 
four inequality scenarios are shown that make the effect of increasing equality 
and changing risk very transparent.  
 
 
 
Reviewer #2 (Remarks to the Author): 
 
The authors responses, edits to the paper (clarifications and/or re-drafting 
where necessary) have clarified my initial concerns.  
 
I have worked through the paper very carefully. I am confident that the paper 
presents an important contribution to the domain. 
 
I am now recommending that the paper be accepted for publication. 
 
Thank you, we are glad that we managed to address the earlier concerns.  
 
 
Reviewer #3 (Remarks to the Author): 
 
Reviewer #3: R&R Comments for “Facing uncertain climate change, 
immediate action is the best strategy”  
 
The authors have improved the readability of the paper and situated it better 
within its literature, though in my view there could still be more insightful 
discussion surrounding the crucial caveats with respect to political economy 
and behavioral constraints, as well as better clarification regarding the 
selection of parameters to feed into their model. Additionally, varying overall 
expected losses removes the ability to make direct comparisons between the 
‘potential losses in all rounds’ game and the ‘losses occur in one random 
round’ game (e.g., lines 129-130).  
 
We agree that this comparison is not straightforward, we now make it clear 
that we refer to the temporal pattern of contributions only. 
 
With regards to overall writing mechanics, considerable editing and 
proofreading is required before this paper should be published, and the 
authors should be careful not to neglect commentary with regards to tables 
and figures (e.g., there is no commentary at all in section 2.1 of the 
Supplementary Material). As mentioned above, justification for selection of 
parameters (e.g. group size, number of rounds considered, proportional 
differences in wealth between R and P players, etc.) would help the reader to 
feel as though there is purpose behind these otherwise seemingly arbitrary 
numbers (though ideally these choices would have been pre-registered to 
assure us that these choices have not been subject to various researcher 
degrees of freedom). 
 
Thank you, we have carefully revised the manuscript to improve the 
connections between the different sections of the manuscript.  
In terms of the parameters: We have tried to use parameters (such as round 
number, group size and wealth) that have been discussed or used in previous 
models or experiments in order to improve the direct comparison. However, 
since this is the first time our multi-loss event game has been presented or 
explored we tried to explore a broad range of parameter space as shown in 
the text and the supplementary material. We agree that there is a large 
amount of freedom in these choices, but we feel that one needs to start 
somewhere to encourage a careful look at such alternative risk scenarios. 
Moreover, in our previous work we have taken exactly this approach for an 
established risk scenario (see Abou Chakra & Traulsen, PLOS CB 2012) – 
here the exploration of a wide parameter space seems to be misplaced, first 
we need to convince the community to look into alternative risk scenarios.   
 
Minor comments: 
 
• ‘Uncertain’ appears twice in the title 
• Line 13: remove ‘that’ 
• Line 15: what is ‘its’ referring to? 
• Line 20: replace ‘needs the’ with ‘requires’ 
• Line 21: replace ‘on’ with ‘at’, remove comma after ‘challenge’ 
• Line 23: ‘describing that the’ doesn’t make sense – revise wording 
• Line 40: ‘draughts’ should be ‘droughts’ 
• Lines 44-45: ‘were’ should be ‘where’, ‘asses’ should be ‘assess’ 
• Line 66: ‘the’ should be ‘then 
• Line 68: remove ‘always’; unless I’m missing something, 0 ≤ ci,r < Wi,r−1   is 
a constraint here, not an assumption 
• Model section: Need to be clear that W is equal across players in your initial 
model, i.e. players are homogeneous (otherwise socially optimal behavior 
stated in lines 75-76 may not hold) 
• Line 69: remove ‘expected’ (appears twice) 
• Line 72: Remove parentheses (you’ve already stated this constraint above) 
• Line 80: I am still uncertain why you only feed into the model groups of size 
2; it would be good to get some justification here. 
• Line 115: should say ‘for risk curves with a threshold’ 
• Line 130: ‘with’ should be ‘where’ 
• Line 137: ‘occur’ should be ‘occurs 
• Line 140: this is a run-on sentence – surround the middle clause with 
dashes, perhaps. 
• Line 144: ‘disaster’ should be singular 
• Figure 3: Again, some explanation for the selection of parameters might be 
useful – seems somewhat arbitrary at the moment. 
• Lines 171-177: These sentences appear to come out of nowhere; I suggest 
deleting these, and moving the following sentence (beginning with ‘Our’) to 
before ‘Specifically’ on line 168. This paragraph does not flow at present. 
• Line 191: again, ‘on’ should be ‘at’. 
• Line 224: needs a reference 
 
Thank you, we have implemented all the minor changes in the text. 
 
• “In addition to a potential loss event in every round or only  in the last round, 
we now consider scenarios with a potential loss only in the first round or in a 
single  random unknown round within the game.” What is this testing 
intuitively? For which climate scenarios is this relevant? 
  
We now explain our reason “The random round captures, most closely, our 
current state since the true timing of when climate change will  
lead to catastrophic losses is unknown. It seems natural to assume that 
individuals will behave as if climate events hit at random times.” 
 
• Line 152: “Random unpredictable risk events” – define? Or should this say 
‘loss events’ instead of ‘risk events’, or ‘unpredictable-risk events’? (It seems 
also that ‘lost fraction’ alpha should instead be called a ‘loss fraction’) 
 
Thank you we used unpredictable-risk events and replaced lost fraction with 
loss fraction throughout the text 
 
• Supplementary: Line 45 should say ‘negotiations’ 
• Figure S4: “It is assumed that poor players lose everything, i.e. αP = 0.5.” I 
think this should say poor players lose half their wealth? 
• Supplementary Section 2.1 lacks any commentary? 
 
Thank you, we have implemented these minor changes in the supplementary 
text. 
 
 
We thank all three reviewers and the editor for their constructive criticism and 
detailed remarks, they helped us to address a number of issues that appeared 
in the earlier versions and thus improved the manuscript a lot.  
REVIEWERS' COMMENTS:  
 
Reviewer #1 (Remarks to the Author):  
 
The authors did a good job in answering the questions raised and in implementing the 
modifications suggested.  
 
I think it would be useful to add a line explaining the intuition of restricting the interactions to 
those between different classes. As I understand, the authors are mimicking a negotiation between 
the group of rich and the group of poor, each represented by one player. This is a natural 
assumption given the natural polarization that occurs in climate change negotiations often a 
consequence of an historical-contribution argument.  
 
I believe that, once the authors reread the paper carefully, they will fix all the missing reference to 
figures (l109, l111,l120,…), the parenthesis with full stops in the middle (l102-104), the sentences 
with too many adverbs, the subject and its verb separated by a single comma (final line of page 2 
in SI), and they will make all the necessary final-step edits to the paper.  
 
Reiterating the overall interest and relevance of the paper, I recommend the paper to be accepted 
for publication.  
 
 
 
Reviewer #3 (Remarks to the Author):  
 
I believe the authors have now addressed the points I raised to the extent possible and have no 
further comments.  
